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Abstract Congruency tasks have provided support for an
amodal magnitude system for magnitudes that have a
“spatial” character, but conflicting results have been
obtained for magnitudes that do not (e.g., luminance). In
this study, we extricated the factors that underlie these
number–luminance congruency effects and tested alterna-
tive explanations: (unsigned) luminance contrast and
saliency. When luminance had to be compared under
specific task conditions, we revealed, for the first time, a
true influence of number on luminance judgments: Darker
stimuli were consistently associated with numerically larger
stimuli. However, when number had to be compared,
luminance contrast, not luminance, influenced number
judgments. Apparently, associations exist between number
and luminance, as well as luminance contrast, of which the
latter is probably stronger. Therefore, similar tasks, com-
prising exactly the same stimuli, can lead to distinct
interference effects.
Keywords Size congruency.Numerical cognition.Mental
number line
Introduction
Magnitudes can be expressed in many distinct notations
and formats, but irrespective of their representation or
modality, they all appear to result in similar behavioral and
neuronal responses (for a review and meta-analyses, see
Cohen Kadosh, Lammertyn, & Izard, 2008). For instance,
studies have reported similar behavioral results for magni-
tudes expressed as number of dots (Gebuis, Cohen Kadosh,
de Haan, & Henik, 2008;Z h o ue ta l . ,2007), pitch
(Rusconi, Kwan, Giordano, Umiltà, & Butterworth, 2006),
time (Xuan, Zhang, He, & Chen, 2007), physical size or
line length (Fias, Lammertyn, Reynvoet, Dupont, & Orban,
2003), and luminance (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, &
Henik, 2008; Cohen Kadosh & Henik, 2006). Concurrently,
imaging studies have revealed support for similar process-
ing mechanisms underlying distinct magnitudes, such as
number, physical size, and line length (Fias et al., 2003)a s
well as luminance (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, &
Henik, 2008; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2005). Functional
magnetic resonance imaging adaptation paradigms have
revealed cross-notation adaptation for numbers and number
words (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, Kaas, Henik, &
Goebel, 2007), as well as for numbers and dots (Piazza,
Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2007), and electroencepha-
lography studies have demonstrated the time courses for the
processing of distinct magnitudes to be highly comparable
(Gebuis, Kenemans, de Haan, & van der Smagt, 2010;
Libertus, Woldorff, & Brannon, 2007). The observation of
similar behavioral and neuronal responses to distinct
magnitudes served as a basis for the ATOM model, which
states that magnitudes that have a similar (often spatial)
metric are encoded by the same amodal magnitude system
(Walsh, 2003). Similarly the triple code model (Dehaene,
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independently of its notation.
Notwithstanding the general level of consensus on an
amodal magnitude system (Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009),
how stimuli that do not have an explicit spatial component
are encoded remains controversial. Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan
and Dehaene (2004) manipulated number, physical size,
and luminance within a single stimulus, and subjects were
required to judge each dimension in separate blocks, a task
often referred to as the numerical Stroop or congruency task
(Algom, Dekel, & Pansky, 1996; Henik & Tzelgov, 1982).
Pinel et al. (2004) demonstrated a congruency effect at the
behavioral level only when subjects had to make numerical
judgments but did not find a congruency effect in the
imaging results, for either the numerical or the luminance
judgment task. In contrast to these null results, two recent
studies did show congruency effects between number and
luminanceat the behavioral level (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen
Kadosh, & Henik, 2008; Cohen Kadosh & Henik, 2006), as
well as the neuronal level (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh,
& Henik, 2008). The authors reasoned that the lack of an
effect in the Pinel et al study was due to the manipulation of
three distinct magnitudes in one stimulus, which probably
resulted in the masking of the underlying interaction
effects. The results of the studies of Cohen Kadosh and
colleagues suggest that the amodal magnitude system is not
limited to magnitudes with a spatial component. However,
on closer inspection, their results appear contradictory:
Faster responses were obtained for stimuli that were
numerically larger and darker (Cohen Kadosh & Henik,
2006), but also for stimuli that were numerically larger and
brighter (Cohen Kadosh et al., 2007; Pinel et al., 2004).
These contrasting results are intriguing, especially when
one considers the metaphor that is often used to describe
our magnitude representations: the mental number line
(Dehaene, 1992). In this metaphor, magnitudes from small
to large are represented from left to right. This idea has
gained support from different behavioral results, where
small numbers appear to facilitate left-hand responses or
responses to left-sided targets, whereas the opposite pattern
occurs for large numbers (e.g. Dehaene, Bossini, &
Gireaux, 1993; Fischer, Castel, Dodd, & Pratt, 2003; but
for a different opinion see: Santens & Gevers, 2008; Gevers
et al., 2010; Bonato, Priftis, Marenzi, & Zorzi, 2009). The
number line is suggested to be “flexible,” since multiple
associations between the same magnitudes (i.e., number
and space) can exist (Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009). For
instance, when subjects imagine a clock instead of a ruler,
opposite effects have been found (Bachtold, Baumuller, &
Brugger, 1998). However, prerequisites for such number
line “flexibility” to occur are the existence of more than one
association between two magnitudes (e.g,. ruler and clock
face) and explicit instructions to observers to imagine either
of these associations. In the studies on number–luminance
associations, these were not present. How, then, to reconcile
the mental number line metaphor with these contradictory
luminance–number congruency findings? Can large numb-
ers be associated with both bright and dark stimuli? Or
might a different, non-luminance-based explanation be
more plausible for explaining the contradictory results
obtained with luminance–number congruency paradigms?
In this study, we specifically focused on the origin of the
number–luminance congruency effects. Apart from the
prevalent hypothesis that luminance is associated with
number, two alternative hypotheses for the interaction
effects are plausible as well. Moreover, these can account
for the contradictory findings introduced above.
The first hypothesis states that it is not luminance per se
but (unsigned) luminance contrast (the brightness of the
stimulus in relation to the brightness of the background)
that explains the interaction effects. In the study in which
numerically large and dark stimuli led to the fastest
responses (Cohen Kadosh & Henik, 2006), a bright
background was used, whereas in the study that revealed
the fastest responses for numerically large and bright
stimuli, a background darker than the stimuli was employed
(Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, & Henik, 2008). In
essence, faster responses were always obtained for the
stimuli that were numerically larger and had a larger
luminance contrast or numerically smaller with a smaller
luminance contrast. This idea was also proposed in a later
manuscript by Cohen Kadosh, Lammertyn and Izard (2008,
p. 135) and is consistent with a study by Durgin (2001) that
revealed contrast adaptation affected numerosity processing
of large numerosities in nonsymbolic notations (i.e., texture
density). The second (more unorthodox) hypothesis stems
from the idea that there might not be any magnitude
association at all, yet subjects simply respond fastest to the
most salient stimulus. The term “salient” here means the
stimulus that directly draws attention due to its stimulus
characteristic, be it size, position, color, or luminance
(contrast). In the present experiment, the more salient
stimulus is the stimulus with the largest luminance contrast.
Note that even though luminance contrast is the factor
underlying the congruency effect in the luminance contrast,
as well as the saliency, hypothesis, both hypotheses can
lead to different outcomes, since the latter does not take
into account the numerical magnitude of the stimulus. For
example, when subjects have to respond to the numerically
smaller stimulus, the luminance contrast hypothesis pre-
dicts faster responses for the numerically smaller number
when it is brighter than for the stimulus presented
simultaneously (e.g., 2 4; smaller number has a smaller
luminance contrast), as compared with the reverse (e.g., 2
4; smaller number has a larger luminance contrast), whereas
the saliency hypothesis would predict the opposite, since
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luminance contrast (e.g., 2 4; smaller number is the most
salient), as compared with a small luminance contrast (e.g.,
2 4; smaller number is the least salient) (see also Fig. 1b).
In the experiments employed so far, the luminance
contrast and the saliency hypothesis were confounded.
Subjects were always requested to respond to the numer-
ically larger stimulus. Under these task instructions, both
the luminance contrast and the saliency hypotheses predict
the same outcome (Fig. 1a reveals that the predictions for
luminance and luminance contrast are the same for the
“numerically larger” instruction whereas Fig. 1b reveals
that this is not the case for the “numerically smaller”
instruction).
In summary, there are (at least) three possible hypotheses
about the number–luminance congruency task: (1) if
number is associated with luminance, numerically larger
stimuli should consistently be associated with either darker
or brighter stimuli (note that in Fig. 1, the predictions for
luminance congruency are presented only for the numeri-
cally larger and darker association; the predictions for the
numerically larger and brighter association would reveal
exactly the opposite pattern); (2) if number is associated
with luminance contrast, numerically larger stimuli should
consistently be associated with stimuli that have a larger
luminance contrast; and (3) if the congruency effects are the
result of saliency, the stimulus with the largest luminance
contrast is always responded to mot quickly, irrespective of
its numerical size.
To specifically test these three distinct hypotheses, we
created a modified version of the number-luminance
congruency task by adding two manipulations: a “contrast
sign” manipulation and an “instruction” manipulation. For
the contrast- sign manipulation, we used an intermediate
gray background, instead of a black or white background.
Consequently, on half of the trials, the stimuli were brighter
than the background, and on half of the trials, the stimuli
were darker than the background (Fig. 1). For the
instruction manipulation, instead of two, we used four
instruction conditions: respond to (1) the numerically
larger, (2) the darker, (3) the numerically smaller, or (4)
the brighter stimulus. The contrast sign and instruction
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Which number is darker? Which number is brighter?
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Fig. 1 The predicted outcomes for the three hypotheses in each of the
six stimulus conditions. The four panels present the instruction
conditions included in the experiment; respond to the stimulus that
is numerically larger (a), numerically smaller (b), darker (c), or
brighter (d). The six stimuli presented at the top of each panel are the
three congruency conditions (congruent, neutral, incongruent) for
stimuli brighter (a, b, c) or darker (d, e, f) than the background. The
lower part of each panel shows the predicted results for the luminance,
the luminance contrast, and the saliency hypotheses for the six stimuli.
The brighter bars correspond to the stimuli brighter than the
background (a, b, c) and the dark bars to the stimuli darker (d, e, f)
than the background. Longer bars indicate slower responses
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distinguish between the luminance, the luminance contrast,
and the saliency hypotheses. Except for the condition in
which subjects had to judge the numerically larger number,
the conditions now predicted outcomes that allow differen-
tiation between the three hypotheses (Fig. 1; bar graphs
show the predicted outcomes for the three hypotheses in
each of the four instruction conditions).
Method
Subjects
Twelve students (between 20 and 27 years of age; M =
23.26, SD = 2.52; 9 female, 3 male) from the University of
Utrecht took part in the experiment. All the subjects were
right-handed, native Dutch speakers and had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. For their participation, they
received course credit.
Stimuli
All the stimuli were displayed on a 22-in> monitor using
the Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems,
Albany, CA). On each trial, the subjects were presented
two Arabic numbers (height, 2° of visual angle), one
presented on each side of the fixation cross. Manual
responses were recorded using a response box.
Eight Arabic numbers (1 to 9, except for 5) and eight
luminance levels (photometric values: 48, 63, 76, 95, 142,
172, 207, and 250 cd/m
2) were used. The luminance levels
were chosen such that they yielded four equal (Michelson)
contrast steps with respect to the background (117 cd/m
2)i n
either direction. Consequently, half of our stimuli were
brighter and half were darker than the background,
producing our contrast sign manipulation. Number and
luminance values together constituted the three congruency
conditions, resulting in the following pairs: (1) the
numerically larger stimulus was darker, (2) both stimuli
wer the same number but had distinct luminance levels or
the reverse,or (3) the numerically larger stimulus was
brighter.
1 These three congruency conditions were further
divided over three number and three luminance distances,
with the number distances being distance 1 (1–2, 3–4, 6–7,
8–9), distance 2 (1–3, 2–4, 6–8, 7–9), and distance 3 (1–4,
6–9) and the luminance distances being distance 1 (48–63,
76–95, 142–172, 207–250 cd/m
2), distance 2 (48–76, 63–
95, 142–207, 172–250 cd/m




The paradigm consisted of two tasks: (1) a number
comparison task, in which subjects had to respond to the
numerical size of the stimulus, and (2) a luminance
comparison task, in which subjects had to respond to the
brightness of the stimulus. Both tasks consisted of two
instruction conditions—our instruction manipulation. In the
number comparison task, subjects had to respond to either
the numerically larger or the numerically smaller stimulus,
whereas in the luminance comparison task, subjects had to
respond to either the darker or the brighter stimulus.
Subjects made their judgment by pressing the button on
the side corresponding with the target location (the stimuli
were blocked for each instruction condition). The target
was presented equally often on the left and right sides of
fixation. Together, the experiment consisted of two com-
parison tasks (1,728 trials per comparison task) that
consisted of two instruction conditions (864 trials per
instruction condition) and two contrast sign conditions
(432 trials per contrast sign condition), which again
consisted of three congruency conditions (144 trials per
congruency), which again consisted of three luminance
distances (48 trials per distance), which again consisted of
three number distances (16 trials per distance). The order of
the four tasks was different for each of the 12 participants
(12 out of the 24 possible combinations of task order were
randomly chosen). Before the experimental trials started,
the subjects received instructions and performed 15 practice
trials. Each trial began with a fixation cross (250 ms),
followed by the stimulus (which remained on the screen
until the subject gave a manual response) and an intertrial
interval (500 ms).
Analyses
For each subject, median reaction times for the correct
responses and error rates were calculated. To investigate the
presence of a congruency effect and its origin, we
performed, for each comparison task separately, a repeated
measures ANOVA with contrast sign manipulation (stimuli
brighter or darker than the background), instruction
manipulation (numerically larger/smaller stimuli; darker/
brighter stimuli), and congruency (neutral, congruent,
incongruent) as within-subjects variables. Thus we had a
2 × 2 × 3 factorial design for each comparison task.
1 We defined our stimuli in terms of the general number–luminance
interaction hypothesis. Even though this interaction is questioned in
our study, we needed to define our stimuli in terms of congruent,
neutral, and incongruent trials. Defining them on the basis of the
number–luminance congruency was the most plausible procedure,
since the other two factors included in our analyses, instruction and
contrast sign manipulation, account for the alternative hypotheses:
contrast and saliency.
262 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:259–265Analyses of the interaction between the numerical
distance of the magnitude dimension relevant to the task
(e.g., luminance in the luminance judgment task) or the
magnitude dimension irrelevant to the task (e.g., number in
the luminance judgment task) and congruency are presented
in the Supplemental Data available online.
Results
Reaction time results
The data for the number comparison tasks resemble the
predictedoutcomesforluminancecontrast(seeFig.2a and b).
The repeated measures analyses revealed a significant
main effect for congruency, F(2, 22) = 4.892, p = .017,
partial η
2 = .31; faster responses were obtained when the
target stimulus was numerically larger and had a large
luminance contrast (or numerically smaller with a small
luminance contrast). The interaction between contrast sign
and congruency, F(2, 22) = 20.690, p <. 0 0 1 ,p a r t i a l
η
2 = .65, was also significant. This interaction confirmed
that luminance contrast interacted with numerical magni-
tude: Faster responses occurred for stimuli that were
numerically larger (or smaller) and had a large (or small)
luminance contrast.
The data for the luminance comparison tasks revealed
a pattern similar to that predicted by the luminance
hypotheses. A significant main effect for congruency,
F(2, 22) = 8.814, p = .002, partial η
2 = .44, was obtained.
This confirmed that number interacted with luminance
processes. In addition, the main effect of contrast sign
manipulation, F(1, 11) = 27.915, p < .001, partial η
2 =. 7 5 ,
and the interaction between instruction and contrast sign
manipulation, F(1,11) = 8.816, p = .013, partial η
2 =. 4 4 ,
were significant.
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Fig. 2 The reaction time results of the number comparison tasks (a
and b) and the luminance comparison tasks (c and d). The insets show
the hypotheses related to our predictions (see Fig. 1). The inset with
the darker silhouette shows the predictions in agreement with the
results. The bright bars show the results for stimuli brighter than the
background (conditions a, b, and c from Fig. 1), whereas the darker
bars show the results for stimuli darker than the background
(conditions d, e, and f from Fig. 1). By definition (see the text), C
means “congruent” with the best-fitting hypothesis (see insets; i.e., the
larger number is darker for the luminance hypothesis, the larger
number has the largest unsigned contrast for the contrast hypothesis,
etc.), N means “neutral,” and I means “incongruent.” In the number
comparison tasks (a, b), the contrast sign manipulation clearly
influenced the results, showing opposite congruency effects. This
opposite effect was absent in the luminance comparison tasks (c, d),
where it is clear that the luminance hypothesis fits our results best. In
both the number and luminance comparison tasks, the instruction
manipulation did not affect the results; the congruency effects are
similar for the larger (a) and darker (b) conditions, when compared
with the smaller (b) and brighter (d) instruction conditions, respec-
tively. The error bars present the 95% confidence interval (Loftus &
Masson, 1994)
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For the number comparison tasks, a main effect of
congruency was present, F(2, 22) = 5.614, p = .011, partial
η
2 = .34, and contrast sign interacted with congruency,
F(2, 22) = 21.745, p < .001, partial η
2 = .66. These results
mirror the reaction time data showing that the congruency
effect was caused by the influence of luminance contrast on
number processing. For the luminance comparison tasks,
contrast sign interacted with instruction, F(1, 11) = 7.923,
p = .017, partial η
2 = .42, suggesting that the overall
accuracy differed between the different task conditions.
Together, the error results suggest that the reaction time
results cannot be explained by a speed–accuracy trade-off.
Discussion
Previous studies (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, & Henik,
2008; Cohen Kadosh & Henik, 2006; Pinel et al., 2004)
generated conflicting results on the number–luminance con-
gruency task. We hypothesized that these conflicting results
can be explained in alternative ways. Instead of luminance
information per se, luminance contrast or even saliency might
have induced the congruency effects. To further disentangle
the processes underlying number–luminance congruency
effects, we expanded the number–luminance congruency
paradigm with two extra manipulations—namely, contrast
sign and instruction.
The results of the number comparison task revealed a
congruency effect that was induced by either luminance
contrast or saliency when subjects had to respond to the
numerically larger stimulus, but when subjects had to
respond to the numerically smaller stimulus, only lumi-
nance contrast could account for the congruency effects.
Therefore, it appears plausible that the interaction effects
obtained for both tasks were induced by luminance
contrast, not saliency. Large luminance contrast stimuli
were thus associated with numerically larger stimuli, and
vice versa. For the luminance comparison task, number
induced a congruency effect: Subjects associated darker
stimuli consistently with numerically larger stimuli.
Although the origin of the congruency effect was
different for the luminance and number comparison tasks
(luminance or luminance contrast, respectively), the
interaction between congruency and (relevant or irrele-
vant) distance consistently revealed the same pattern (see
the Supplementary results). In both tasks, the congruency
effect decreased with increasing distance of the relevant
dimension and increased with increasing distance of the
irrelevant dimension. These results suggest that both
magnitudes were not processed in a crude manner, but in
a more refined one, which is compatible with the results
from previous studies (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh, &
Henik, 2008;C o h e nK a d o s h&H e n i k ,2006).
From our findings, we conclude that two distinct factors—
namely, luminance contrast and luminance—interacted with
number. Although seemingly contradictory, this result is
easily explained by the differential strength of these inter-
actions and the task conditions chosen. First, in the number
comparison task, a luminance contrast, instead of a luminance
effect, was apparent. This suggests that the mapping of
luminance contrast onto number is stronger than the mapping
of luminance onto number (assuming that luminance does
map onto number). Therefore, the previously found lumi-
nance–number interactions (Cohen Kadosh, Cohen Kadosh,
&H e n i k ,2008; Cohen Kadosh & Henik, 2006)s h o u l db e
attributed to luminance contrast effects only. Second, our
targets were brighter than the background on half of the trials
and darker than the background on the other half (our
contrast sign manipulation). Therefore, responding to lumi-
nance contrast (or saliency; be it explicitly or implicitly) in
the luminance comparison task would lead to chance
performance. In this case, a relatively small but significant
interaction between number and luminance emerged. Note,
however, that in this task, luminance was compared, not
number. Therefore, from these results, it can be concluded
only that number can be mapped onto luminance processes,
not the reverse. The converse is true for the number
comparison task. Here, it can be concluded only that
luminance contrast can be mapped onto number processes.
Even though the number–luminance (contrast) interactions
can be explained in terms of a mapping at the magnitude
representation level, alternative explanations for congruency
effects in (for instance) Stroop paradigms have been proposed
as well (e.g., Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; Pansky
&A l g o m ,2002). In addition to a mapping at the level of
magnitude representations, a mapping at the intermediate
conceptual (e.g. larger, smaller, brighter, darker) as well as
the response level (left or right) could be distinguished as
well. An increasing number of studies on numerical
cognition have hinted at such a mapping at the intermediate
conceptual representation level (e.g., Gevers, Lammertyn,
Notebaert, Verguts, & Fias, 2006; Pansky & Algom, 2002;
Santens & Gevers, 2008) and have excluded the possibility
of a mapping at the response level (e.g., Gebuis, Herfs,
Kenemans, de Haan, & van der Smagt, 2009;G e b u i se ta l . ,
2010). Therefore, although the present results cannot
differentiate between these different explanations, an inter-
action at the intermediate conceptual level appears the most
likely explanation for our results.
In summary, we demonstrate that luminance contrast can
be mapped onto numbers and numbers onto levels of
luminance. However, the latter was obtained only when
luminancecontrastorsaliencywascontrolledfor.Whetherthe
interactions occur in the opposite direction as well (luminance
264 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:259–265interferes with number or number interferes with luminance
contrast) remains an open question. Our results explain
previous contradictory findings and give a valuable insight
into possible factors that can induce number–luminance
interferences. Those inclined to use the number–luminance
congruency task in the future should pick their stimuli and
taskconditionsinsuchamannerthatmultipleexplanations,of
which some are unrelated to magnitude, can be excluded.
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